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as his advocacy of the *quid pro quo* theory of taxation, and his assertion that permanent division would have been better for the United States than the preservation of unity at the cost of war. Nevertheless, several of his conclusions are worthy of careful attention. He finds the cause of the continuance of war and of the increase of state functions to be a division of interest between the people who are governed and the class of politicians who do the governing; the people desiring, according to his opinion, only peace and the decrease of taxes; and the politicians desiring a multiplication of state functions and functionaries, in order to provide places for as many of their number as possible. This desire can be gratified only in two ways—by the extension of state control over lines of business heretofore private, and by war and territorial expansion; and these, accordingly, are the prevailing tendencies of the age. This explanation of “state socialism” and of the “recrudescence of war” certainly has the merit of simplicity. And, so far as concerns the interest of politicians of all parties in the multiplication of office and office-holders, our American experience gives it decisive confirmation.

The last ninety pages are occupied by various appendices containing a mass of statistical and other information concerning war, several of them of considerable value.

EDWARD VAN DYKE ROBINSON.

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Industrial Experiments in the British Colonies of North America.

By ELEANOR L. LORD. Baltimore, The Johns Hopkins Press, 1898.—x, 154 pp.

The economic reasons that induced England to encourage the production of naval stores in her American colonies were in complete harmony with the doctrines of Mercantilism. In the first place, since England was dependent for these commodities upon Sweden, Russia, Norway and Denmark, the result was an adverse balance of trade with these countries. This condition, regarded by the economist of that day as very serious, would be remedied, it was believed, if the colonies were to produce these stores. Again, it was argued that, if this could be brought about, the colonists would have a staple to export to England in payment for manufactures; and thus the nascent colonial manufacturing industry would be checked, while England's manufactures would increase. In brief, it was hoped that, as a result of this policy, not only would an adverse balance of trade be done away with, but in addition the colonies would cease manufacturing,

because by exporting naval stores to England they could obtain such articles with less economic effort. Traces of these ideas can be found early in the seventeenth century, but only during the War of the Spanish Succession was this policy of encouraging by bounties the production of naval stores in the colonies embodied in law.

It is of this policy, of these industrial experiments, that Miss Lord treats in her able monograph. We were already fully acquainted with the economic theories on which this policy was based, and we knew to what extent the policy had been successful. Miss Lord throws no new light on the general lines of England's commercial policy : what was essential we knew before. Her careful study of the documents in the English Record office has, however, not been time wasted, for by giving us many details she has made our knowledge of this phase of English policy toward the colonies complete and unquestioned. The subject is, moreover, well handled ; the arrangement of the matter is systematic ; and the monograph is clearly written and interesting — a rare characteristic in works of this character. Irrelevant, purely antiquarian, details, such as abound in other recent publications on American economic history, are not to be found.

Only one point suggests criticism, and this criticism is not specifically directed against Miss Lord, but applies to practically all other economic historians. This class of students cannot sufficiently condemn the general historian who does not lay adequate stress on the economic history of a state. But such a writer can with equal justice retort that economic historians as a rule fail to comprehend that economic policies are often shaped by non-economic considerations. Specifically, Miss Lord's work is deficient in the failure to point out and explain in detail the military reasons for the policy described by her. At that time England's supremacy on the seas was just being established, and the importance of her sea power was recognized by the government, though not so clearly as it was later. She was engaged in continual wars, and in these wars the navy played an important part. Accordingly, a recognition of the military danger arising from England's dependence for these naval stores upon foreign countries was a very potent factor in leading the English government to encourage the production of these articles in the colonies. This was not the controlling factor, but it was an important one, to which due weight should be given.

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